The Palestinians refused to accept the resolution because it treated them merely as refugees, while Syria was not enthusiastic about accepting and recognising the right of the Jewish state in the Middle East. Syrian refusal to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 made the prospect of an Israeli withdrawal a non-starter. For most of this period, the issue remained unsolvable because of the uncompromising positions of either or both sides. The period since 1967 when the Golan Heights came under Israeli control, can be categorised into five main phases. Despite the initial euphoria and the vast parliamentary majority, the Barak-led government could face most of the difficulties that confronted the previous Labour government. This paper would examine and analyse the in-built difficulties and problems that Israel faces in accepting the demand for a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Settlement of the Golan issue to the satisfaction of both parties, is a pre-condition for any fruitful conclusion of a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. The long held peace-for-peace formula whereby both countries would make peace, with Israel retaining the entire, or a substantial portion of the Golan, has become an unrealistic preposition even inside Israel. Any decision concerning withdrawal would be influenced by a number of internal factors, long-held perceptions and strong emotional arguments, most of them domestic. Likewise, the position of the Netanyahu-led government (1996-1999) should not be taken merely as an outcome of the right-wing ideology. A significant section of the Labour Party was opposed to any territorial concession on the Golan thereby weakening Rabins negotiating positions. The inability of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to publicly commit to a substantial Israeli withdrawal was not accidental. There are various domestic and regional issues and concerns that influence, dictate and even undermine that policy.
The Israeli position vis-à-vis the Heights, does not reflect the concerns of a particular political party or group. The election of Ehud Barak in May 1999 has once again rekindled the hopes of a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Syrian dispute.
The victory of Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1996 and his commitment for a peace-with-Golan had effectively ended the negotiation process. This realisation enabled the Rabin-Peres government (1992-1996) to pursue serious and substantial negotiations with Syria in Washington. This position has increasingly become more apparent in the Israeli discussions on the peace process. Any Israeli-Syrian peace, however, would undoubtedly involve a substantial if not complete, Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. Paraphrasing Moshe Dayan, it is possible to argue that the Golan without peace is more vital for Israel than peace without the Golan. A complete withdrawal by itself would be insufficient to ensure peace and security for Israel but withdrawal is essential for peace. Given the conflicting positions of the parties, any peace agreement between Israel and Syria pre-supposes an amicable settlement of their dispute over the Golan. If lack of a viable military option compelled Syria to seek a diplomatic solution, prolonged political isolation and non-recognition of its claims by the international community drove Israel to seek a peaceful settlement. The absence of a direct dialogue or negotiations facilitated both countries to reiterate their respective positions without attempting a compromise and acceptable solution.īy going to Madrid in October 1991, both countries undertook to resolve their disputes peacefully. Continued Syrian insistence on the return of the Golan is confronted by prolonged Israeli aversion to the idea of partial, let alone, complete withdrawal.
It revolves around the question of control and sovereignty over the Heights, which remain under Israeli control since the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967. Unlike other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the problem of the Golan Heights is definite and unambiguous. Despite his uncompromising position vis-à-vis Syria in public even the outgoing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared to have pursued back channel diplomacy to revive the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. The decisive victory of Labour leader Ehud Barak in the May 1999 Israeli elections has rekindled the prospects of peace between Israel and Syria. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, June 1994 1 Whoever would like to say that he is for all the Golan Heights, has to prepare for war, three, five or seven years from now or ten years from now. A Monthly Journal of the IDSA October 1999 (Vol.